Booknotes:
Mistakes Were Made (but not by me)
Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson
Harcourt, 2007
Just about anyone who has serious conversations with others has felt puzzled at times to discover how tenaciously someone can hold on to a prized opinion in the face of over-whelming evidence to the contrary. What is even more puzzling is recognizing that after a good debate in which both sides have been putting out their best evidence, the parties do not move any closer to agreement. In fact, often they go away more convinced than ever of their own positions.
How can it be that the human species, which is supposed to be the most rational species, sometimes just isn’t very rational at all? This would be easier to accept if the pockets of irrationality were only found in persons not like us. Or someone who is obviously not an expert. Or someone we judge lacks intelligence. The problem is that cock-eyed thinking happens to everyone; it happens to people just like us. And if we have the courage to admit it, it happens to us more often than we think.
Tavris and Aronson have offered us a very thoughtful exploration of how we go about justifying mistakes. It is not surprising that we look for good reasons to bolster the choices we make. Sometimes we are trying to convince others, but just as often we are reassuring ourselves. The more evidence and argument we can accumulate, the better we feel. In their very insightful book about mistakes Tavris and Aronson use solid research from a long tradition of inquiry to which they have both contributed.
The basic notion with which Tavris and Aronson work is “cognitive dissonance.” Put very simply: we do not like to have contradictions in our system of attitudes and behavior. Urged on by our own need for consistency we sometimes go to odd lengths to make the system consistent again. We may engage in elaborate justifications of our own behavior or assemble memories with distortions or blatant inaccuracies. Tavris and Aronson generously offer examples of such distortions in their own thinking. They also help us take another look at the behavior of public figures whose stories we have encountered in the news. And here and there they make us uncomfortable about ourselves as we read, because they motivate us to think about our own distortions.
What social psychology can tell us about cognitive dissonance is useful for therapists on two levels. In the process of listening carefully to our client’s narratives we often become aware that parts of the story do not fit. We observe the distortions. It is not particularly useful to write them off as neurotic, and it is even less useful to personalize a client’s motives and assume that an attempt is being made to deceive us. What can be useful is listening from a patient stance until we understand why the jagged edges of the story are so difficult and why it was so important to our client to try to make them consistent again. This recognition identifies the location of our work as we engage with our clients to find a narrative that is both more consistent and less distorted.
This takes us to the second level at which being aware of cognitive dissonance is a therapist’s good friend. As we listen to our clients we get caught up in our own inconsistencies. When we think we have made a good diagnosis we do not like to hear evidence to the contrary. When our clients make value statements that are inconsistent with our own we may too easily jump to the judgment that their view is a manifestation of pathology while our own an expression of health. Sometimes we are competitive with our clients. We may not be happy to see them resolve life problems in areas where we ourselves remain stuck. Or we may subtly enlist our clients to prove us right by encouraging them to make the same mistakes we have made in order to make our own look more reasonable and normal.
Cognitive dissonance explained as Tavris and Aronson do gives new meaning to the therapist’s struggle with counter-transference. The hazard of transference is not limited to the danger that our own neurosis will find a dancing partner with the neurosis of our clients. They take the pathology out of cognitive dissonance and help us to see the everydayness of it. It is a lovely reminder that therapists need supervision by their peers not because they are bad therapists but because they are human. And of course the supervision we need is from persons to whom we have given permission to challenge the dissonance and self-justifications in our own thinking. Using some of the ideas offered by Tavris and Aronson is a good start.
Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson are both deans of social psychology. They have been researchers and teachers for decades, and both are good models of scientist helpers. Tavris has written textbooks for use in the classroom. Aronson has been President of the American Psychological Association in which role he has been an observer of the broad expanse of both the science and the practice of psychology. It is clear from their writing that beyond the intent to propagate interesting ideas, they are eager to put their ideas to the service of others. This wonderful little volume on mistakes and self-justification is clear and entertaining. It is good reading for anyone who believes that ideas make a difference and wants to be accountable for their own.
http://aronson.socialpsychology.org/
http://tavris.socialpsychology.org/
